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1. Introduction 
In the late 1960s I asked my “Brains, Machines, and Mathematics” class at Stanford to 
draw block diagrams identifying and relating the major functional subsystems of the brain. 
I took these diagrams home, redrew them on large sheets of brown paper, and attached them 
to the walls of my bedroom so that I could look at them in search of the best composite 
diagram. When I showed them to John McChesney, a friend from the English Department, 
he proclaimed, “So, these are your metaphors for the brain”. And thus the title of my 
book The Metaphorical Brain was born. Deeper reflection showed that the title had two 
meanings-not only that our models of the brain can be seen as metaphors, but also that 
the operation of the brain is inherently metaphorical, building “models of the world” which 
provide metaphorical descriptions of fragments of the organism’s world. 
I am most grateful to the Book Review Editors of the journal Arti’cial Intelligence 
and to Messrs. Barnden, Hanson and Pribram for the Multiple Book Review of The 
Metaphorical Brain 2: Neural Networks and Beyond (TMB2; Arbib [3]) and the chance to 
respond in these pages. This response is being prepared in 1997, the 25th anniversary of 
the publication of The Metaphorical Brain: An Introduction to Cybernetics as Artijicial 
Intelligence and Brain Theory (TMB; Arbib [2]) to which TMB2 is the sequel. The 
subtitles tell something of the changing times of these books: In 1972, “symbolic AI” 
was dominant, and I sought to balance this dominance by looking back to the Cybernetics 
of the 1940s and to show that it was the source not only of AI in this limited sense but 
also of brain theory, as well as biological control theory, and cognitive psychology. In 
1989, half the battle had been won and artificial neural networks (Hopfield networks, 
back-propagation, etc.) were enjoying a heyday, and so now my subtitle was designed 
to recognize the importance of such neural networks, but also to show that one must go 
“beyond”, most especially with the development of schema theory, but also with a fuller 
appreciation of neuroscientific data, and of the immense subtlety of living neurons. 
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Barnden has done a fine job of reviewing the contents of TMB2, and all three reviewers 
have offered some pointed criticisms of the book. I will not attempt to repeat Bamden’s 
summary, nor answer every detailed comment, but I will take advantage of this opportunity 
to clarify some of my ideas and to give a sense of how my views have changed in the past 
decade, as reflected in part in the book Neural Organization: Structure, Function, and 
Dynamics (AESz; Arbib, Verdi and Szentagothai [9]). 
Barnden notes that TMB2 “is not, and could not be, anywhere near encyclopedic on 
such fields; the emphasis is rather on aspects of those fields that serve in some way to 
illustrate, support or constrain the central theoretical ideas of the volume.” For example, 
Bamden notes that TMB2 contains no description of “... Adaptive Resonance Theory... 
[nor of] automatic learning of topological maps”, and so I am happy to note that these are 
treated in The Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks (HBTNN; Arbib [5]), a 
book which is encyclopedic in its coverage of brain theory and neural networks. 
Hanson suggests TMB “was great and there are probably diminishing returns on 
reading [TMB2] if you’ve already read [TMB]“. However, I strongly disagree about the 
diminishing returns. There is so much new in TMB2. But I think the use of “2” may have 
made people think the returns would be diminishing. Anyway, in writing such a book there 
is always the issue of what needs to be reiterated and what can be omitted either because 
it is disparate or because it can now be assumed known. The main themes of this response 
are that (a) TMB2 is still very much worth reading eight or more years after publication 
because it still says important things not well covered elsewhere in the AI and neural net 
(NN) literature (including the first TMB); (b) it was not perfect and some pointers can add 
to a reading of it today, and (c) the field continues to progress, and some facets of that 
progress will be outlined below. 
2. The hologram metaphor 
Karl Pribram finds that “What is presented is valuable but seems to reflect accepted 
dogma in the neurosciences (as Horace Barlow [15] has called it) rather than a broader 
perspective of metaphors and their instantiation and substantiation in the neuroscience 
laboratory.” In fact, Barlow asks whether “Single Units and Sensation” provide “A Neuron 
Doctrine for Perceptual Psychology”, and I would say that TMB2 is far from accepting this 
as dogma. TMB2’s emphasis on action-oriented perception shifts the frame of reference for 
perceptual psychology, and its emphasis on schemas and cooperative computation takes 
us far from single units and sensation. However, the real problem seems to be that I do 
not value Pribram’s hologram metaphor: “What I [Pribram] miss most, of course, is a 
follow-through on what in the earlier book TMB was entitled ‘The Hologram Metaphor’ 
to which Arbib devoted a section of six pages. In The Metaphorical Brain 2 he dismisses 
this particular metaphor with [a single] paragraph.” Pribram then devotes 2600 words of 
his 3300 word review to that one paragraph! 
He later asks “Why, with the exception of the development of PDP neural networks, does 
Arbib... exclude the work that has developed from the holographic metaphor? There must 
be some clear intellectual basis for this exclusion.” The basis is both generic and specific: 
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(a) Even though TMB2 is longer than TMB, there were a number of items in TMB that 
were removed to stop TMB2 from being even longer. 
(b) As my quoted paragraph made clear, I was not convinced of the validity of the 
hologram metaphor as Pribram viewed it; and the very success of work on Hopfield 
nets and other models of associative networks led me to devote space to these rather 
than to Pribram’s writings. 
However, since Pribram has set forth his work at such great length, I should respond to 
a number of the issues he raises. 
I learned a great deal of neuropsychology from Pribram when I was a junior faculty 
colleague of his at Stanford, and I remain grateful for this experience and value what I 
learned. I also studied most of the papers by Pribram and others available at that time 
(196551970) and formed the conclusion then that a look at his new book (Pribram [33]) 
only confirms. We owe to Pribram many rich insights from his studies of the behavior of 
lesioned monkeys into the way in which distinctive psychological functions (schemas) are 
distributed over distinctive sets of brain regions (see, e.g., Pribram [31]). Such insights are 
too often ignored by people whose study of NNs is based on the adaptation of a single, 
initially unstructured network. However, his skill in the neuropsychological laboratory 
does not, in my opinion, transfer to theory. Pribram allows himself one low blow in his 
review when he says that “[the quoted] paragraph illuminates what can go wrong when 
one reports only what one reads and has no direct experience at the neurophysiological 
bench”. I could equally say of Pribram’s 1991 book that the Appendices illuminate what 
can go wrong when one relies on others for one’s mathematics and has no direct experience 
of mathematical research. These appendices were written primarily by Kunio Yasue and 
Mari Jibu, and essentially recycle the type of mathematics familiar in quantum mechanics. 
It is claimed that the theory is relevant because the functions are defined on a “dendritic 
manifold’, but the mathematics remains formal, and no evidence is given that it can be 
used to analyze behaviors of realistic sets of linked dendritic trees within a realistic glial 
environment receiving realistic patterns of synaptic input. My favorite is Appendix D 
which starts with a mention of amygdalectomy but then provides only a general formalism 
with no theorems deduced from it, and no mention of how one would tell a “normal” 
dendritic manifold from one appropriate to a brain from which the amygdala has been 
removed. But enough for low blows and counterpunches. Let me stress that Pribram 
draws our attention to a number of important phenomena, even while I disagree with his 
theoretical claims. 
Pribram cites much interesting work on visual neurophysiology, but I still see “no 
evidence that the neural system has either the fine discrimination of spatial frequencies 
or the preservation of spatial phase information needed for such Fourier transformations 
to be computed with sufficient accuracy to be useful [for the reconstruction operations 
demanded by the original hologram theory].” However, it is true that Gabor functions and 
wavelets have been applied quite successfully in vision, though more for recognition than 
reconstruction. Anyway, no book can cover everything! Even HBTNN does not discuss 
Pribram’s version of the hologram metaphor-but it does have articles on wavelets and on 
the use of holograms in photonic implementation of NNs, as well as three articles which 
mention other contributions by Pribram. 
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Pribram asks: “Why not give credit to the holographic metaphor for being one of 
the critical factors... helping to give birth to the PDP neural networks enterprise? David 
Willshaw[‘s . ..I thesis and subsequent work with Buneman and Longuet-Higgins were 
inspired by holography. This work was already quoted in the chapter on Neural Holograms 
in my Languages ofthe Bruin (Pribram [32]).” I am happy to acknowledge that Pribram’s 
hologram metaphor was one important motivation for work on associative networks (see 
TMB for more on this). However, the correspondence with Willshaw et al. reproduced by 
Pribram [32] explicitly rejects the “literal” form of the hologram metaphor espoused by 
Pribram, and offers a different metaphor more in tune with current associative networks. 
Pribram notes that Figure 2.3.9 of TMB2 includes a panel at a magnification “displayed 
in such a way that one can readily imagine the neurochemical field effects that must be 
operating as processing takes place.” He then argues that “It is at the synapto-dendritic 
level that neural computation occurs. The neuron is not the unit of processing. The synapse 
is”. There is no unique “the” unit of processing, but I think Pribram is right to insist that 
we pay attention to this level of detail. 
(i) Pribram notes that “simulations of [synapto-dendritic] processes... have been made 
by Shepherd... and by Perkel... . These simulations deserve a hearing...“. Yes, it is 
good work, but Wilfrid Rall’s seminal work on dendritic processing is based not on 
holonomy but on extensions of the Hodgkin-Huxley equations (see the articles by 
Rall and by Segev in HBTNN for more details). 
(ii) People studying synaptic plasticity are now paying attention to the possible role of 
the diffusion of nitric oxide in the intracellular medium. 
(iii) There is increasing work on glia, though the role of glia seems more concerned 
with neuron maintenance and repair than with “computations” (though this may 
change). 
(iv) Certainly, field effects deserve and are receiving study. 
My approach is to seek the simplest model that does the job, and in TMB2 I found that 
much could be explained at the level of synaptic interaction of neurons without attention to 
finer levels of detail or to field effects. However, I am prepared to accept complexities when 
I have to do so, and recent findings push me below the neuron to consider neuromodulation, 
eligibility, and dendritic processing. Indeed, although in TMB2 I chose to use the neuron as 
the cutoff level, flags for more detail were raised in Sections 6.1 (Neuromodulation) and 8. I 
(Synaptic Complexities). An important virtue of HBTNN is that it draws the attention of the 
reader to these complexities. Roadmap II.5 (pp. 4.5-46) of HBTNN introduces the reader 
to the relevant articles. However, it is true that topics like field effects, volume conduction, 
and glial processing were mainly ignored, and should not be in the next edition. 
In summary: There is no doubt that the work of Gabor and Shannon provides tools 
that are being used in Brain Theory today (HBTNN provides a rich set of examples), 
and Pribram draws our attention to important styles of neural processing of which Brain 
Theory currently takes little heed. His latest book, Brain and Perception: Holonomy and 
Structure in Figural Processing, contains a wealth of noteworthy empirical data-but it has 
not convinced me that neural holograms or the holonomic brain theory provides the right 
framework for analysis of these data. 
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3. Frogs 
Hanson notes that there are “10 references on frogs peppered throughout the text” and 
adds that “I don’t really mean to disparage frogs here. I even think the examples of the 
frog’s visual system are presented in a relevant useful way. Nonetheless,... although the 
frog’s tectum gets fair representation in the book, it is hard to struggle back to the schemas 
and computational backdrop that the book promotes.” 
My response has two trivial parts: 
(a) TMB2 reflected my then current publications and enthusiasms. In hindsight, I would 
say that the material in Section 5.1, Schemas for Frog and Toad, is still appropriate, 
while the exposition in Section 7.3, Modeling the Frog Tectum, was too detailed and 
that today’s reader may well skip the latter section. 
(b) 1 think the richness of topics in TMB2 is such that there would be d&continuities in 
switching from one important topic to another, no matter what pruning or reordering 
one attempts. 
Now to the important part, namely to demonstrate why an interest in frogs is not an 
authorial indulgence, but an important ingredient in a general understanding of the brain: 
(i) The best-known study of visual coding, the work of Hubel and Wiesel on the cortex 
of cat and monkey, emphasizes “general” features like bars and edges that are 
neutral to the life of the animal. Lettvin et al. (1959), in studying “What the Frog’s 
Eye Tells the Frog’s Brain”, not only provided equally important results on neural 
coding per se, but also related this visual coding to the behavior of the animal. 
with talk of “bug detectors” and “enemy detectors”. As TMB2 shows, much has 
been done to show how further neural circuitry is required to build on this initial 
processing. Nonetheless, we have here a fundamental insight into “action-oriented 
perception” missing in the mammalian literature of that time. 
(ii) Much classic literature of vision focused on “object recognition” as mediated by 
visual cortex. It was the work on frog vision that inspired the insight into subcortical 
mechanisms of vision that could subserve visually-guided action in the absence 
of visual cortex, and provides an evolutionary basis for the later recognition of 
separate cortical pathways for “vision for action” and “vision for recognition” 
(Milner and Goodale [30]; Jeannerod [26]). 
(iii) Discussion of monkey superior colliculus (the mammalian homologue of tectum) 
has mainly focused on “approach behavior”, namely eye movements to fixate a 
target, whereas frog studies have long addressed both “approach to prey” and 
“avoidance of enemies”. It is only relatively recently that studies in rat (Dean, 
Redgrave and Westby [ 181) have brought the balanced study of approach and 
avoidance into the mammalian literature. 
(iv) The models of these frog behaviors have inspired work in robotics (e.g., Arkin [ 12, 
131). 
In this spirit, mechanisms of frog visuomotor coordination are again presented in the 
“Functional Overview” in AESz, with less important results from TMB2 omitted, and new 
results and evolutionary insights added. More generally, comparative neuroethology, the 
study of the neural mechanisms underlying diverse forms of behavior in different species, 
provides vital lessons both for the study of the human brain, and for the design of novel 
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robots. Unfortunately, a lack of understanding of the historical and continuing importance 
of studies of frog vision and behavior has made it very hard to get funding for related 
research, and the database for frog neuroethology has come close to a standstill. 
4. From action to language 
This section of the response provides a brief snapshot of recent work on action-oriented 
perception in mammals which builds atop my earlier studies of the frog. Arbib [7] 
explores the hypothesis that various subregions (but by no means all) of posterior parietal 
cortex are specialized to process visual information to extract a variety of uffordunces 
for behavior. This discussion of affordances is informed by the attempt of Section 7.2 of 
TMB2 to place the ecological perception of J.J. Gibson within a computational framework. 
We introduce two biologically-based models of regions of monkey posterior parietal 
cortex. The model of the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) emphasizes its roles in dynamic 
remapping of the representation of targets during a double saccade task, and in combining 
stored, updated input with current visual input (Dominey and Arbib [ 191). The model of 
the anterior intraparietal area (AIP) addresses parietal-premotor interactions involved in 
grasping, and analyzes the interaction between AIP and premotor area F5 (Fagg and Arbib 
[22]). The model represents the role of other intraparietal areas working in concert with 
inferotemporal cortex as well as corollary discharge from F5 to provide and augment the 
affordance information in AIP, and suggests how various constraints may resolve the action 
opportunities provided by multiple affordances. Finally, we develop a systems-level model 
of hippocampo-parietal interactions underlying rat navigation motivated by the monkey 
data used in developing the above two models as well as data on neurons in monkey 
posterior parietal cortex sensitive to visual motion. We note the formal similarity between 
dynamic remapping (primate saccades) and path integration (rat navigation), and explain 
certain available data on rat posterior parietal cortex in terms of affordances for locomotion. 
We also suggest the utility of further modeling linking the World Graph model of cognitive 
maps for motivated behavior with hippocampal-parietal interactions involved in navigation 
(Guazzelli et al. [23]). These models demonstrate that posterior parietal cortex is not only 
itself a network of interacting subsystems, but functions through cooperative computation 
with many other brain regions, thus demonstrating anew one of the basic claims of TMB2. 
Section 5.4 of TMB2 presents three models of language which are described in much 
greater detail by Arbib, Conklin and Hill [8]. My main foray into language since then has 
built on the work on brain mechanisms of grasping mentioned above. A key finding for 
that work was that neurons located in the rostra1 part of inferior area 6 (area F5) discharge 
during active hand and/or mouth movements and that discharge in most F5 neurons 
correlates with an action rather than with the individual movements that form it (Rizzolatti 
et al. [35]). One may thus classify F5 neurons into various categories corresponding 
to the action associated with their discharge, the most common being “grasping-with- 
the-hand” neurons, “grasping-with-the-hand-and-the-mouth” neurons, “holding” neurons, 
“manipulating” neurons, and “tearing” neurons-a “vocabulary” of motor schemas. 
Further study revealed something unexpected-a class of F5 neurons that discharge 
not only when the monkey grasped or manipulated objects, but also when the monkey 
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observed the experimenter make a gesture similar to the one that, when actively performed 
by the monkey, involved activity of the neuron (Rizzolatti et al. 1361). Movements yielding 
mirror neuron activity when made by the experimenter include placing objects on or taking 
objects from a table, grasping food, or manipulating objects. Mirror neurons, in order to be 
visually triggered, require an interaction between the agent of the action and the object of 
it. The simple presentation of objects, even when held by hand, does not evoke the neuron 
discharge. These neurons (mirror neurons) appear to represent a system that matches 
observed events to similar internally generated actions, forming in this way a link between 
the actor and observer. Transcranial magnetic stimulation and PET experiments showed 
that a mirror system for gesture recognition exists also in humans and includes Broca’s 
area. Rizzolatti and I (Arbib and Rizzolatti [lo]; Rizzolatti and Arbib [34]) have argued 
that it is the addition of such an observation/execution matching system that provides 
the necessary bridge from “doing” to “communicating about doing” in the evolution of 
the neural mechanisms for language. Many authors have argued for a gestural basis for 
language (e.g., Hewes [25]; Kimura [28]; Armstrong et al. [ 141). We bolster the argument 
by asserting the crucial role of an observation/execution matching system for grasping 
in monkeys which provides a representation of “expectations” which can both guide the 
monkey’s own actions and enable it to comprehend the actions of other monkeys. We posit 
that a crucial process in language evolution was that the link between actors and observers 
became a link between the senders and receivers of messages. 
5. Schema theory 
Pribram notes that the concept of a “[schema], used extensively by Henry Head and by 
Sir Frederick Bartlett, is meant to give unity to the exposition. A schema, Arbib holds, is 
much like a program in that it has many different instantiations. On p. 207 the attributes 
of schemas are listed. I interpret these as defining distributed map-like structures which 
can be cascaded in a variety of combinations during processing. In a sense they are a more 
sophisticated version of cell assemblies (such as those proposed by Donald Hebb (1949)) 
which partake of the property that any particular neuron or schema can participate in a 
variety of processes by being coupled to a variety of other assemblies or schemas.” 
Indeed, schema theory attempts to bridge between structure and function at the highest 
level. This theme is further developed in Chapter 3, “A Functional Overview”, of AESz. 
Bamden is concerned that “the detailed discussion of the dynamics and feedback control 
of muscles makes little direct contact with schema theory (though clarifying what motor 
schemas need to do in order to control muscles), and the same is true of the overviews 
of artificial neural net frameworks.” But this is to miss the point that the essence of a 
multi-level approach to a brain, or an artificial cognitive system, is that no one level 
is sufficient. Schemas (functional) and neural networks (structural) are just two of the 
levels extending down into neurons, dendrites, synapses, and the molecular processes 
beneath them. As is clear from my response to Pribram’s concerns about “The Hologram 
Metaphor”, there is no single level of analysis of the nervous system (structurally stated) or 
cognition (functionally stated). Methodologically, detailed modeling at one level may serve 
to calibrate an approximate model at a higher level-it is possible to model the differential 
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effect of thousands of synapses on a single neuron; but if one must model hundreds of 
thousands of neurons, then one must determine a reasonably accurate way of aggregating 
the effect of those synapses on each neuron. Another form of aggregation is the use of 
statistical mechanics to analyze neural networks, though here the constraint of biological 
subtleties is still scant (Zippelius and Engel [39]). Barnden is concerned that “some 
readers may feel that [Arbib’sl approach leads to too discrete a division of behavior into 
schemas. For instance, in discussing prey acquisition by toads, Arbib proposes (pp. 219- 
222) one perceptual schema for detecting a barrier, one for detecting a chasm, and one for 
detecting the free prey condition (no barrier or chasm). But there is no argument that it is 
indeed appropriate to postulate separate schemas here.” However, whether or not there are 
“separate schemas here”, I stress that schema-level models can be invalidated, and provide 
the basis for yet better models, without descending to lower levels, on the basis of lesion 
and behavioral data (see, e.g., Fig. 3.3 and Section 3.4 of AESz). 
Barnden continues “[Arbib] points out that a single region of the brain might subserve 
many schemas, and a schema (or instance) might involve several regions. (I would have 
preferred less talk of regions as opposed to just subsets of the total set of neurons.)” 
This last point is well taken. A given brain region contains many subsets of neurons 
which may be distinguished anatomically or, even within an anatomically defined class, 
physiologically by their differential involvement in different functions. For example, 
Dominey and Arbib [ 191 analyze several brain regions involved in the rapid eye movements 
known as saccades, and in each region separate those neurons involved in the Current 
Saccade Motor Schema from the Target Memory Schema that holds data about the next 
saccade. 
Barnden asserts that “analogical processing as a replacement for more rigid deductive 
reasoning is an important and fruitful idea, one that could usefully have received extensive 
and detailed discussion in the book.” Mary Hesse and I have discussed such ideas at some 
length in The Construction of Reality (Arbib and Hesse (1986)) within an epistemological 
context, but it is true that much further work must be done to link studies of analogy 
with the schema theory of TMB2. Hesse and I also study, informally, “social schema?. 
These are patterns of behavior exhibited by many members of a society (cf. the “collective 
representations of Durkheim [2 1, p. xii]), and which we see as providing the statistical 
regularities for a newcomer to a society (e.g., a child acquiring language, TMB2, Section 
5.4) to interiorize these regularities via the formation of “schemas in the head”. 
Barnden finds me “sympathetic to high-level units of behavior emerging in some subtle, 
distributed way from neural networks. This resonates with standard connectionist claims 
that such things as rules can be merely emergent from subsymbolic computation.... Arbib 
also says that high-level units such as rules can enable the system to avoid a great 
deal of expensive, highly parallel, low-level processing (p. 247) . . . [but] one might have 
conjectured that highly parallel, low-level processing is not a drain on the overall system 
in the first place.” I can address this by expanding upon Seidenberg’s [38] claim that a 
connectionist model of past-tense learning in English does more justice to psycholinguistic 
data than a rule-based model which sees the user of English learning the rule “add -ed” plus 
a list of exceptions “is-was, go-went, etc.” because, for example, subjects will provide an 
irregular past form for a nonsense word if it is similar to a set of irregular verbs with 
parallel past tenses. However, Seidenberg does not address the fact that, when learning a 
M. At-bib /Artificial Intelligence 101 (1998) 323-335 331 
second language, we do memorize rules for the past tense and invoke them in the early 
stages of learning. My claim would be that we have (to simplify) two interacting neural 
nets, one which can learn rules, and one which can process data in a “connectionist way”. 
When learning our first language, we first learn “connectionistically” (i.e., statistically 
through experience) and may later come to learn rules by reflecting upon this mechanism. 
Conversely, when we learn a second language in the usual manner, the “rule network’ 
can both serve to control language use initially, and to train the “connectionist net”. 
Fluency comes when the connectionist net can provide correct behavior more quickly 
than can invocation of the rule net. Much connectionism focuses on single networks being 
trained by a single learning rule. By contrast, TMB2 stressed the interaction of multiple 
networks with different architectures and functions. This idea has at last begin to enter the 
connectionist literature (Jordan and Jacobs [27]). The deeper point is that the ability of the 
mind to reflect on its own operations is a crucial aspect of human rationality (whatever its 
imperfections) and must eventually find its proper place within brain theory-just as the 
notion of “knowledge about knowledge” presents an enduring challenge for AI in general. 
This is related to the view of consciousness offered in TMB2, Section 8.3. 
Barnden notes that “The dynamic formation of... higher-level schemas is one type of 
learning that Arbib hints at, although he does not provide a detailed account of how it 
might work;” while Hanson suggests that “Schema acquisition might be an appropriate 
place to start understanding the structure of schemas and the nature of their organization for 
brain function. After all, the way schemas are learned and then subsequently guide learning 
might be diagnostic of the way they are used and organized by the brain. Surely, the subtle 
interplay of perception and memory would be a key element of schema acquisition and 
consequent usage.” The work of Jane Hill (briefly reviewed in Section 5.4 of TMB2) is 
one excursion in that area. Recently, Fernando Corbacho has laid the groundwork for a 
general theory of Schema-Based Learning (SBL). A very preliminary version appeared in 
(Corbacho and Arbib [ 171); more general papers are now in preparation. 
However, most work on schema learning by my group has not involved a general theory 
of SBL, but has rather involved the following sequence: (i) Given some behavior of interest, 
show how it may be achieved through the interaction of multiple schema instances, then 
(ii) show how, by careful attention to the data of neuroscience, these schemas may be 
implemented through the cooperative interaction of multiple biological neural networks of 
the brain, and, finally (iii) show how learning (modeled in terms of synaptic plasticity in 
neural networks) can improve the efficacy of these schemas. Studies of this kind include: 
l the role of cortico-striatal plasticity-modeled using reinforcement learning-in 
visuo-motor conditional learning and sequence learning (AESz, Sections 10.4.2 and 
lOS.l), and 
l the role of cerebellum-modeled using error-based learning-in improving motor 
control in both saccades and throwing (Schweighofer, Arbib and Dominey [37]; 
Arbib, Schweighofer and Thach [ 111; AESz, Section 9.4.4). 
Barnden found it unclear how my “schemas resemble or differ from the schemas of 
Piaget, or the similar constructs of other authors whose work he reviews.” I would say 
that Piaget tends to concentrate on large undifferentiated schemas, and tends to see them 
as passing through a pre-ordained series of stages, whereas I see schemas as being of a 
far finer grain so that an assemblage of schema instances is active at any one time, with 
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stages then emergent from schema interactions and accommodation, rather than being the 
determinants of schema formation. Arbib [6] is a further attempt to place my work within 
a far broader context of what may be seen as contributions to schema theory from Kant to 
the present day. 
Hanson accepts the need for schemas, but laments that “there are promissory notes 
throughout the early part of the text not paid off later. Instead we get a scholarly discussion 
of the topics and concepts, but typically without much resolution. For example, one might 
posit different types of schemas, ones perhaps that vary in abstractness or perhaps have 
some domain or topic dependency and then this begins to look like a vocabulary, dictionary 
or even simple taxonomy. Unfortunately, nothing like this is spelled out in the book.... what 
seems to be avoided here are serious issues of Generalization... given a schema how do I 
calculate its similarity to other schemas and other input data? What determines the level 
of abstractness of a given schema? When does a schema have precedence over sensory 
data?’ As the earlier paragraphs make clear, some of these promises have been kept, but 
others are overdue and I can only hope that others will join the small group who are already 
contributing to the development of the theory. However, I think it may be useful to note 
that the term “schema theory” is being used in two different senses (Arbib [4]): 
There are two facets to schema theory, as a language and as a theory of intelligent 
behavior. In, for example, RS (Lyons and Arbib [29]) and the VISIONS schema 
system (Draper et al. [20]), we see the beginnings of a language for distributed 
systems at a level abstract enough to convey some real understanding of complex 
problem solving behaviors and yet precise enough that we can refine the specification 
to some concrete implementation. Yet when we discuss brain models and advocate 
a class of designs for AI systems that is inspired by them, we see the other facet 
of schema theory, a model of intelligence, which uses schema theory qua language 
for expressing such models. In the language sense, schema theory is more like group 
theory than relativity theory. Relativity theory is a model of the physical world- 
it can be falsified or revised on the basis of physical experiments. However, group 
theory stands or falls for the scientist seeking to explain the world (as distinct from 
the mathematician proving theorems) not by any criterion of whether it is true or false, 
but rather on whether its terminology and theorems aid the expression of successful 
models. Schema theory as an abstract model of computation does not yet have the 
rigor or stock of theorems of group theory, but the success of models using the 
language of instantiation, modulation, activity levels, etc., strengthens its claim to 
be a valuable tool in the development of Artificial Intelligence as well as Brain 
Theory. However, the language of schema theory has developed in tandem with a 
schema-based theory of human and artificial intelligence, such as that given in the 
sections [of [4], and related sections of TMBZJ on Schema Modulation and Evolution, 
Memory, Perception, and Action, Schemas for Rana computatrix, Schemas and High- 
Level Vision, and Schemas and Learning. It is in the latter sense that one can make 
such statements as that in schema-theoretic models of language and other cognitive 
functions “there is a tendency (though not a necessity) to root such models in action 
and perception.” In either sense, the paradigm of schema theory is indeed evolving 
in a fashion well suited to contribute to distributed artificial intelligence as well as to 
bridge between cognitive science and brain theory, too. 
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Appendix A. Structuring the hook 
TMB2 has an unevenness of tone because, as Hanson says, “At times TMB seems to 
be an attempt at more of a textbook genre, as there is considerable introductory material... 
[but Arbib] migrates beyond simple textbook structures to a more personal view of the 
field involving computation, brains and mathematics.” For example, computer scientists 
and psychologists know so little “in-discrete” mathematics that the author has a difficult 
choice: to avoid mathematics entirely, to supply the necessary exposition, or to assume 
that the reader has the necessary background. Churchland and Sejnowski [16] take the 
first approach (there are a few skippable equations), TMB2 takes the second, while AESz 
takes the third. The middle way is probably less elegant but, for a certain class of readers, 
more helpful than the other two. The reader who wishes to “hum the mathematics” (in the 
memorable phrase of Peter Medawar) rather than read the details will still be able to reap 
most of the benefit of TMB2. 
Pribram finds the organization of the themes that unify the book unsatisfactory: 
“Beginning with the section on Schema Theory (p. 204) we are shuttled from frogs to 
Shepard figures and machine vision and shortly thereafter to human language. Arbib 
uses these various topics as examples of the importance of a certain type of internal 
representation which he calls schemas... My problem is not with the concept of schema 
per se but with separating this section from discussions in Part III of vision, action and 
memory. In Part III one loses sight of schemas and thus of the putative coordinating theme 
of the volume.” 
In TMB2. my strategy was to offer an introductory overview before introducing neural 
networks with examples from vision, action and memory, then introduce schemas with 
examples from vision, action and memory, and finally to offer separate chapters on vision, 
action and memory in turn. The reader who wishes a new ordering of the sections when 
reading TMB2 might use the following course syllabus. The material was supplemented 
by lectures from HBTNN: 
Introduction: Chapter 1. Brain, Behavior and Metaphor; 2.1. Action-Oriented Per- 
ception and Intelligence; 2.3. The Brain as a Network of Neurons: 2.4. A Functional 
Perspective on Neuroanatomy; 3.3. Visual Preprocessing; the portion of 4.3 on the 
Didday Model of Prey-Selection (Winner-Take-All); NSL Neural Simulation Lan- 
guage (HBTNN). 
Systems Theo?: 3.1. Systems Concepts, 3.2. Feedback and the Spinal Cord. 
An Introduction to Schema Theory: 2.2. Perceptual and Motor Schemas; 4.1. 
McCulloch’s Principles; 4.2. Constraint Satisfaction & Relaxation; 5.1. Schemas for 
Frog and Toad. 
Learning: 3.4. Adaptive Networks; 8.2. Connectionist Models of Adaptive Networks; 
Reinforcement Learning (HBTNN), Reinforcement Learning and Motor Control 
(HBTNN); 4.3. Competition and Cooperation in Neural Nets: Self-Organizing 
Feature Maps-Kohonen maps (HBTNN). Statistical Mechanics of Neural Networks 
(from Hertz et al. [24]); Artificial Intelligence and Neural Networks (HBTNN), 
Cognitive Modeling: Psychology and Connectionism (HBTNN); 8.3. Memory and 
Consciousness. 
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&ion: 7.1. Depth Perception; 7.2. Optic Flow; 5.2. Vision in Perspective; 7.4. The 
Many Visual Systems. 
Action: Reactive Robotic Systems (HBTNN); 6.1. Rhythm Generators and Locomo- 
tion, 6.2. Control of Eye Movements. 
TMB2 material not covered this time were: 4.4. A Mathematical Model of Neural 
Competition; 5.4. From Schema Theory to Language; 7.3. Modeling the Frog Tectum; 
8.1. Mechanisms of Neuronal Plasticity; 9.1. Where we are; and 9.2. From Brain 
Theory to the Sixth-Generation. 
Hanson speculates that “The revolution [in the study of artificial neural networks] in 
recent years, may have begat interest in the updating of the book.” In fact, this is not true- 
the growth in understanding of the themes introduced in TMB was the main motivation 
for TMB2. Hanson is correct however that “very little about the coherence of neural 
networks receives much confirmation from [TMB2.... The] book seems to be unaffected 
by the revolution. Indeed, in a late chapter on Memory and Learning we find references 
and discussions to PDP, Kohonen etc. almost like an afterthought.” However, this is in part 
the “Pribram Problem” again--something had to come last, and I chose the order Vision, 
Action, Memory for my concluding round. What Hanson fails to note is that key ideas (as 
distinct from formal theory) are elaborated early, in Section 4.3, in highlighting the theme 
of Competition and Cooperation in Neural Nets. However, in 1988 there were few results 
that strongly linked PDP and Kohonen to my main concern-the integration of action and 
perception. As both HBTNN and AESz (with Peter Erdi’s strong emphasis on dynamics at 
various levels of neural modeling) demonstrate, much has changed in the last decade, and 
the above course outline reflects those changes. 
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